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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, 18-year old Devin James McCullough pied guilty 
to one count of felony injury to a child. He received a unified sentence of seven years, 
with three years fixed, and the court retained jurisdiction. Mr. McCullough was 
anticipating that he would receive probation so, while still on his rider, he filed an Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion seeking probation. The district court 
promised Mr. McCullough that he would receive a hearing on that motion should his 
Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI), recommend 
relinquishment of jurisdiction. On February 1, 2012, however, the district court 
relinquished its retained jurisdiction without a hearing. 
On appeal, Mr. McCullough contends that this sentence represents an abuse of 
the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts. He further 
contends that the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing its jurisdiction, in 
failing to reduce this sentence or place him on probation pursuant to Mr. McCullough's 
Rule 35 motion, and in failing to provide him a hearing as promised. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In March and April of 2011, Mr. McCullough was attending Kuna High School. 
(Presentence Investigation Reporter (hereinafter, PSI), p.30.) He was a senior and was 
on track to graduate with his classmates in May of 2011. (R. p.42.) 
1 
Sometime in March of 2011, Mr. McCullough and an acquaintance, 15-year old 
M.B., were hanging out in the counseling center at Kuna High School. (PSl, 1 p.23.) 
M. B. was upset and feeling down that day; Mr. McCullough was trying to cheer her up. 
(PSI, p.23.) He was flirting with her, and took her cell phone. (PSI, p.23.) They went 
into the conference room and Mr. McCullough pushed himself up against M.B.; while 
holding her head, he began "dry humping" her in the area of her buttocks, and touching 
her breast and vaginal area over her clothes. (PSI, p.23.) M.B. told McCullough "no" 
and asked him to stop, which Mr. McCullough did. (PSI, p.23.) 
On a different occasion, on or about April 2, 2011, while hanging out with his 
fifteen-year old girlfriend, K.M., at a friend's home, Mr. McCullough grabbed K.M. 
around the waist and while they were kissing, Mr. McCullough touched K.M. on top of 
her clothing, touching her breasts, vagina, and buttocks. (PSI, p.22.) K.M. asked 
Mr. McCullough to stop, and he did. (PSI, p.22.) 
Based on these two incidents, Mr. McCullough was originally charged with two 
counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years. (R., p.6.) As part of a plea 
agreement, the information was amended down to a single count of felony injury to 
child. (R., pp.47-48; 07/21/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.6-8.) The State agreed to recommend three 
years fixed, and seven years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence of ten years. 
(07/21/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-9.) The State also stated that it might recommend a rider, 
depending on the results of the psychosexual evaluation. (07/21/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-11.) 
Defense counsel was free to argue for less. (7/21/11 Tr., p.3, L.15.) Mr. McCullough 
pied guilty to felony injury to child on July 21, 2011. (07/21/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-14.) 
1 For ease of reference, several documents have been grouped together and identified 
as the "PSI." Those documents include: the PSI and all attachments, the Addendum to 
the PSI, the Psychosexual Evaluation, and the Sex Offender Risk Assessment. 
2 
The psychosexual evaluator, Mr. Johnston, found that Mr. McCullough was 
amenable to treatment. (Psychosexual Evaluation (hereinafter, PSE), pp.80, 83.) 
Further, Mr. Johnston put a note in the body of his report that qualified the results of his 
tests with a defendant who was so young, noting that "age should be taken into 
consideration-many individuals who are 18 years old do present with antisocial traits .. 
. this is a reflection of immaturity, not deep-seated personality characteristics." (PSI, 
p.72.) Dr. Johnston also noted that Mr. McCullough's impulse control issues were likely 
related to his age. (PSI, p.73.) 
At sentencing, the State relied on the findings and conclusions contained in the 
psychosexual examination in making its sentencing recommendation. (09/01/11 Tr., 
p.18, Ls.16-25; p.20, Ls.9-20.) The State portrayed Mr. McCullough as a former 
wrestler who was using his size in an attempt to overpower smaller, younger females. 2 
(09/01/11 Tr., p.15, L.22 - p.16, L.9; p.17, L.19.) At the sentencing hearing, the State 
asked for a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, and a retained 
jurisdiction.3 (9/1/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.23-24; p.20, Ls.22-24.) Mr. McCullough's defense 
counsel asked the court to put Mr. McCullough on probation and to consider a withheld 
judgment. (09/01/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.16-18.) Defense counsel advised the court that 
Dr. Michael Johnston, Mr. McCullough's psychosexual evaluator, had a conversation 
with defense counsel in which Dr. Johnston said that some of the testing results are 
2 It should be noted that Mr. McCullough was only 5 foot 6 inches and weighed 170 
pounds at the time of the incidents. (PSI, p.4.) Although he is, in fact, larger than K.W., 
who was 5 foot 6 inches and 104 pounds (04/19/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.20-23), Mr. McCullough 
is not the hulking giant the State tried to portray him as. 
3 The State actually reduced its recommendations from what it had agreed to under the 
plea agreement-down from three years fixed, plus seven years indeterminate, to three 
years fixed, plus four years indeterminate, presumably based on the results of the PSI. 
(09/01/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.16-24.) 
3 
"skewed" based upon Mr. McCullough's age and maturity. (09/01/11 Tr., p.23, Ls.17-
21; R., pp.58-59.) In their conversation, Dr. Johnston advised defense counsel that by 
the very nature of these tests, they tend to accentuate immature, impulsive behavior 
that is typically exhibited by individuals 18-years old or younger. (09/01/11 Tr., p.23, 
L.22 - p.24, L.2.) Further, Dr. Johnston advised defense counsel that, had 
Mr. McCullough taken these tests at age 28 versus age 18, the results may not have 
come out as skewed or as indicative of immature and impulsive behavior. (09/01/11 Tr., 
p.24, Ls.3-7.) The district court, relying heavily on the recommendations contained in 
the PSE,4 sentenced Mr. McCullough to three years fixed, plus four years 
indeterminate, with a retained jurisdiction. (9/1/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.3-1 0; R., pp.51-53.) 
Defense counsel immediately moved the court to reconsider its sentencing 
decision and place the defendant on probation instead of retaining jurisdiction. (R., 
p.61.) Defense counsel requested that the court set a hearing so that Dr. Johnston 
could testify to further explain how the results of the psychosexual evaluation are 
"skewed" due to Mr. McCullough's age and level of maturity. (R., pp.58-59.) 
The district court initially set an expedited hearing for September 15, 2011. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.35, Ls.6-14.) At the hearing, defense counsel advised the court that he 
would like to call Dr. Johnston to testify regarding some additional information that 
defense counsel believed might make a difference to the court in crafting 
Mr. McCullough's sentence. (09/15/11 Tr., p.35, L.16 - p.36, L.25.) Defense counsel 
asked the district court to schedule a hearing at which Dr. Johnston would testify as to 
what was the appropriate placement for Mr. McCullough. (09/15/11 Tr., p.35, L.16 -
4 The district court admitted that the results of the psychosexual evaluation factored 
predominantly into its sentence, "[o]kay, I did. I did base, gave weight, to Dr. Johnston's 
report ... ". (09/15/11 Tr., p.41, Ls.23-24.) 
4 
p.36, L.25; p.37, Ls.18-22.) The State did not object to the presentation of additional 
evidence to the court. (09/15/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.3-7.) The court said that it would 
schedule another hearing so that defense counsel could elicit testimony from 
Dr. Johnston, but noted that it was not sure where Mr. McCullough was in the system 
and it was reluctant to interrupt Mr. McCullough's planned treatment to bring him back 
for a hearing. (09/15/11 Tr., p.38, L.6 - p.39, L.9; p.41, Ls.4-10.) The district court re-
set the hearing for October 20, 2011, in the event that Mr. McCullough could be brought 
back for the hearing. (09/15/11 Tr., p.39, Ls.8-9.) The district court also promised that, 
should they [the Idaho Department of Correction] recommend that Mr. McCullough go to 
the penitentiary, it would allow Mr. McCullough a hearing5 at which Dr. Johnston could 
testify further as to the results of the psychosexual evaluation and why he does not 
believe Mr. McCullough should be sent to the penitentiary. (09/15/11 Tr., p.39, L.11 -
p.40, L.19.) 
THE COURT: Okay, this is what I'll do. If he comes back from the rider 
and they recommend that he go to the penitentiary, then we'll have a 
hearing, let Dr. Johnston come in and explain that he doesn't agree with 
that. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.41, Ls.15-19.) 
The October 20, 2011, hearing was later vacated and was not rescheduled, 
presumably so as to not interrupt Mr. McCullough's programming. The district court had 
not issued a decision on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion. Mr. McCullough was 
unsuccessful on his rider, primarily due to an incident involving his peers6 (three other 
inmates) in which they "conspired" to steal food from the kitchen. (PSI, pp.3, 14.) Thus 
5 It is not entirely clear when the district court contemplated that the promised hearing 
would occur-for the Rider Review or as a Rule 35 hearing if it relinquished jurisdiction. 
6 Mr. McCullough was known to have difficulty resisting peer pressure. (PSI, p.58.) 
5 
the rehabilitation specialist recommended relinquishment even though Mr. McCullough 
had "demonstrated that he was amenable to sex-offender treatment in the community." 
(PSI, p.5.) 
On February 1, 2012, the district court relinquished jurisdiction without a hearing 
and ordered Mr. McCullough to serve the underlying sentence previously imposed. (R., 
p.64.) The court based its decision to relinquish jurisdiction on the Report from the 
Department of Correction. (R., p.64.) Fourteen days later, on February 15, 2012, 
Mr. McCullough, through his counsel, filed what is best construed as a renewed Rule 35 
motion and he again requested a hearing. ( See R., p.66.) Although Mr. McCullough 
requested a hearing and indicated that he would like to present mitigating evidence not 
present or reflected in the APSI (R., p.66), no supporting documentation was ever filed, 7 
and on February 28, 2012, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion without a hearing 
(R., pp.68-69). On February 29, 2012, Mr. McCullough filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., 
pp.70-71, 78.) Mr. McCullough appeals from the Judgment of Conviction, the Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction, and the district court's Order Denying Motion to Reduce 
Sentence. (R., p.70.) 
7 Mr. McCullough presumably did not submit written documentation because he 
anticipated eliciting the testimony of Dr. Johnston orally, before the court, and he had 
advised the court of this both in his Rule 35 motion (R., pp.58-60) and at the 
September 15, 2011, hearing (09/12/11 Tr., p.35, L.16 - p.36, L.25). Further, the 
district court had promised Mr. McCullough that he would have a hearing at which Dr. 
Johnston would be permitted to testify, should jurisdiction be relinquished. (09/15/11 
Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) 
6 
ISSUES 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to hear Mr. McCullough's appeal? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
seven years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. McCullough following his plea of 
guilty to felony injury to child? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction over 
Mr. McCullough? 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it deprived Mr. McCullough of the 
opportunity to present testimony from the psychosexual evaluator, and unduly 
limiting the information it considered in ruling on Mr. McCullough's Idaho Criminal 




This Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear Mr. McCullough's Appeal 
A Introduction 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. McCullough's appeal. Mr. McCullough's 
appeal is timely as to the district court's sentencing determinations, the district court's 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction, and the district court's denial of Mr. McCullough's 
Rule 35 motion. 
B. The Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear Mr. McCullough's Appeal As To The 
Excessiveness Of His Sentence, The Relinquishment of Jurisdiction, And The 
Denial Of Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 Motion 
Mr. McCullough asserts that this Court has jurisdiction to hear his appeal from 
the original Judgment of Conviction, the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, 
and the denial of his Rule 35 motion. Questions of jurisdiction are questions of law that 
are given free review. State v. McCarthy, 133 Idaho 119, 122 (Ct. App. 1999). Lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that may be raised at any time in the course of 
judicial proceedings and may not be waived by the parties. Id. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 provides that "no defendant may file more than one 
motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this Rule." Idaho case law, such as State 
v. Battens, 137 Idaho 730, 732 (Ct. App. 2002), and State v. Hickman, 119 Idaho 7, 9 
(Ct. App. 1990), holds that only one Rule 35 motion seeking to reduce a sentence may 
be filed. However, Battens and Hickman were both cases in which the district court had 
denied the first Rule 35 motion, then the defendant filed a second Rule 35 motion. 
8 
Botten and Hickman are distinguishable from Mr. McCullough's case. In this 
case, Mr. McCullough filed a Rule 35 motion on September 13, 2011. The district court 
did not rule on the motion for 155 days. 8 On September 15, 2011, the district court 
conducted a hearing on Mr. McCullough's Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for 
Expedited Hearing. ( See generally 09/15/11 Tr.) Although the district court did hold a 
hearing immediately after Mr. McCullough filed his Motion for Reconsideration of 
Sentence and Request for Expedited Hearing, the district court did not grant or deny 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 at the hearing. (See generally 09/15/11 Tr.) In fact, the 
district court promised Mr. McCullough that he would receive a hearing at a later date, 
and it set the matter out for a hearing on October 20, 2011. 9 (09/15/11 Tr., p.39, Ls.8-9; 
p.40, Ls.15-19.) The district court stated that it would hear testimony on the Rule 35 
motion regarding the appropriateness of placing Mr. McCullough on probation, but it 
wanted to delay the hearing until the court received Mr. McCullough's rider report. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) 
On or about February 1, 2012, 10 the district court relinquished jurisdiction without 
a hearing and ordered Mr. McCullough to serve the underlying sentence previously 
8 The language of Rule 35 states that a district court "may reduce a sentence within 120 
days after the filing of a judgment of conviction or within 120 days after the court 
releases retained jurisdiction." I.C.R. 35. However, a district court's timeline to rule on 
a Rule 35 motion can be extended past the 120 day limit. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
has recognized that the trial court may allow additional evidence to be submitted in 
support of a Rule 35 motion, and may defer ruling on the motion for a reasonable time 
to allow the submission of such evidence. State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820, 823 n.2. 
(Ct. App. 2008). The district court wanted to see if Mr. McCullough passed his rider 
before hearing testimony in favor of probation. Thus, the delay was reasonable in light 
of the rationales for the time limit. 
9 The Rule 35 hearing set for October 20, 2011, was vacated on October 4, 2011. 
10 The Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction was signed by the district court on February 2, 
2012, but the clerk's date stamp indicated that the document was filed on February 1, 
2012. (R., p.64.) 
9 
imposed. (R., p.64.) On February 15, 2012, 155 days after filing his Motion for 
Reconsideration, Mr. McCullough attempted to precipitate action on his pending motion 
by filing a renewed Rule 35 motion. (R., p.66.) This filing is best interpreted not as an 
improper attempt to take two bites of the apple, but merely a reminder to the district 
court that Mr. McCullough was waiting to present the testimony of Dr. Johnston and to 
get a decision on his (first) Rule 35 motion. In his motion, Mr. McCullough requested a 
hearing and indicated that he would like to present mitigating evidence not present or 
reflected in the APSI (R., p.66), but he did not file any documentation in support of his 
motion, and on February 28, 2012, the district court denied the Rule 35 motion without a 
hearing (R., pp.68-69) Thus the district court did not enter an order regarding 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion until February 28, 2012 (R., pp.68-69), i.e., 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion was pending from September 15, 2011, until 
February 28, 2012. Thus the appeal period for the sentence did not begin to run until 
February 28, 2012, and Mr. McCullough's appeal of the district court's sentencing 
decision is properly before this Court. On February 29, 2012, Mr. McCullough filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.70-71, 78.) 
Mr. McCullough properly appealed the excessiveness of his sentence. The 
district court filed the judgment of conviction and order retaining jurisdiction on 
September 6, 2011. (R., pp.51-53.) Mr. McCullough filed his Rule 35 motion (Motion 
for Reconsideration and Motion for Expedited Hearing) and supporting brief on 
September 13, 2011. (R., pp.58-61.) Thus, Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion was filed 
seven days after the entry of judgment, making it a timely Rule 35 motion. I.C.R. 35. 
Further, Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 was filed within fourteen days of the entry of 
judgment, so it stayed the period of time Mr. McCullough had from which to appeal from 
10 
the judgment of conviction. See I.AR. 14(a). Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), 
the appeal period for the judgment and sentence then begins to run only upon the date 
of the file stamp on the order deciding such motion. Mr. McCullough's appeal was 
therefore timely from the Judgment of Conviction, the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
and the Order Denying Rule 35 Motion. 
Even if the September 13, 2011, Rule 35 motion was insufficient to stay the time 
for appeal of the sentence, this Court still has jurisdiction to determine whether the 
district court abused its discretion in relinquishing jurisdiction and denying 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion. 
C. At A Minimum, This Court Has Jurisdiction To Hear The Appeal Of The Order 
Denying Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 Motion And The Order Relinquishing 
Jurisdiction 
Alternatively, should this Court find that Mr. McCullough's filing of the Motion for 
Reconsideration on September 13, 2011, did not effectively preserve the issue of 
sentencing on appeal by staying the time pursuant to I.AR. 14(a), the district court's 
decision to relinquish jurisdiction and the denial of Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion are 
properly before this Court on appeal. Mr. McCullough filed a Notice of Appeal on 
February 29, 2012. Mr. McCullough's appeal is, therefore, timely both from the district 
court's order of relinquishment, filed on February 1, 2012, and the district court's order 
denying Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion, filed on February 28, 2012. At a minimum, 
this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the district court's February 2, 2012, 
Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and the February 28, 2012, Order Denying Motion to 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven 
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. McCullough Following His Plea Of Guilty To 
Felony Injury To Child 
A. Introduction 
Several mitigating factors are present in Mr. McCullough's case, all of which 
indicate that a more lenient sentence would be appropriate, particularly in light of factors 
such as: Mr. McCullough was only eighteen years old at the time; although his victims 
were fifteen years of age, they were peers who were attending high school with 
Mr. McCullough; and Mr. McCullough expressed remorse and accepted responsibility 
for his wrongful acts. 
The district court's insufficient consideration of all the mitigating factors, and 
therefore, its insufficient consideration of the sentencing criteria set forth in Idaho Code 
Section 19-2521, caused it to abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. 
This Court should remedy that abuse. 
B. The District Court Failed To Sufficiently Take Into Consideration The Numerous 
Mitigating Factors Present In This Case And Therefore Imposed An Excessive 
Sentence 
Mr. McCullough asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of 
seven years, with three years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
12 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). On appeal, the focus on review is 
upon the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Bayles, 131 
Idaho 624, 627 (Ct App. 1998). Mr. McCullough does not allege that his sentence 
exceeds the statutory maximum. As the sentence is not illegal, Mr. McCullough must 
show that the sentence is unreasonably harsh in light of the primary objective of 
protecting society and the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Id. 
Mr. McCullough is immature for his age, sexually inexperienced, and presumably 
was bumbling along in his interactions with his female peers, 11 misreading cues, the 
result of which was he acted inappropriately and was over-aggressive, thus scaring 
them instead of romancing them. (09/01/11 Tr., p.22, L.16 - p.26, L.25.) 
Mr. McCullough has consistently described his crime involving K.M. as the following: 
"after [Mr. McCullough] tried to persuade the victim to have sex with him and she 
spurned his advances, he stopped his sexual advances and went home." (PSI, p.8.) 
Further, these girls were not strangers. He was in a dating relationship with one of 
them. (PSI, p.2.) The other girl was a friend/acquaintance whom he was attempting to 
comfort and flirt with, prior to making his move, while in the counseling center at school. 
(PSI, p.2.) 
Further, Mr. McCullough does not have a history of violence or substance abuse 
issues, 12 and has the support of his family. (09/01/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.17-24.) Although he 
11 The two victims were sophomores in high school, Mr. McCullough was a senior. 
~09/01/11 Tr., p.23, L.2.) 
2 In fact, Mr. McCullough asserted that he is "very, very against drugs." (PSI, p.32.) 
13 
was expelled from school over the incident, he was determined to finish his schooling 
and graduated with a 3.1 GPA (09/01/11 Tr., p.24, Ls.11-14; PSI, p.60.) 
Mr. McCullough was even recruited to attend Wyoming Technical College, "Wyotech," in 
the fall. (09/01/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.1-2; PSI, p.34.) In February of 2011, Mr. McCullough 
was a college-bound eighteen-year old. Now he is simply Inmate #101165, another 
resident of Idaho State Correctional Institution for a unified sentence of seven years. 
(PSI, p.2; R., p.52.) Instead of graduating with an associate's degree in auto collision 
repair in approximately May of 2014 (PSI, p.60), Mr. McCullough will be parole eligible 
on August 17, 2014, and will "top out" his time on August 16, 2018 (R., p.52). 
Mr. McCullough was only eighteen years old when he committed the instant 
offenses. (PSI, pp.21, 57.) In addition to his young age, Mr. McCullough does not have 
any prior felony convictions. (PSI, p.26.) Prior to these charges, Mr. McCullough had 
nothing more significant than a couple petit theft convictions on his record-for 
shoplifting with his peers. (PSI, pp.26, 34, 58.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be 
accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 
Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State 
v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two counts of drawing a check without 
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pied guilty to the charge of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and 
Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no 
prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. The 
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Hoskins court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the 
absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. Here, Mr. McCullough did not have 
a criminal history beyond his petit theft charges. 
Another aspect that should have received the attention of the district court is the 
fact that Mr. McCullough has strong support from family members and friends. See 
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who 
had the support of his family and employer in his rehabilitation efforts). 
The letters from his friends and family reveal a hardworking, pleasant kid, with 
whom parents permitted their teenage daughters to spend time, and who always had an 
easy smile and pleasant demeanor. (PSI, pp.95-114.) It is telling that Mr. McCullough 
received over a dozen letters in support of his character. (PSI, pp.95-114.) 
Mr. McCullough received character reference letters from a former teacher at Kuna 
High, the Dennis Tech Center Principal, a Kuna High School counselor, 13 his parents, 
his grandparents, parents of his friends, etc. (PSI, pp.31, 95-114.) At sentencing, the 
State attempted to discredit the supportive letters, claiming that Mr. McCullough was 
some sort of "Dr. Jekyll Mr. Hyde"-nice to some but brutally aggressive to others, 14 
instead the letters in support of Mr. McCullough's character paint a picture of a good kid, 
13 Ms. Shoemaker submitted: 
I never found Devin to be aggressive or calculating in negative behavior. 
Devin could be influenced by peers and impulsive in some decisions. 
However, as he matured he was becoming more thoughtful in his 
decisions .... I am confident that Devin will move forward and continue to 
be a responsible contributor to society. 
(PSI, pp.31, 100.) 
14 "And another thing that's concerning is there must be some difference or a 
presentation to the rest of the community, the way his parents and friends support him, 
to show that face to the community .... " (9/1/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.10-13.) 
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and someone who was trusted and well-liked. (PSI, pp.31, 95-114.) Unfortunately, 
Mr. McCullough was an immature 15 eighteen-year old who was apparently trying 
(ineffectively and inappropriately) to determine what he would need to do or say in order 
to have romantic relations with his female peers. But, immature as he may have been, 
Mr. McCullough was an adult and must pay the price for his actions as an adult. 
The pre-sentencing investigator described Mr. McCullough as "polite and 
appropriate in his communication, while he also presented as an impulsive, socially 
immature eighteen (18) year old male who acted without consideration for how his 
behavior would be perceived by the recipient." (PSI, p.35.) The pre-sentence 
investigator concluded that Mr. McCullough's behavior could be managed within the 
community and that he was a viable candidate for community supervision. (PSI, p.35.) 
Further, Mr. McCullough expressed great remorse for his conduct and took 
responsibility for his acts. (PSI, pp.34-35.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency is 
required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts 
responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. 
Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Mr. McCullough verbalized accountability for his actions at his pre-sentencing 
interview. (PSI, p.35.) Even during his unsuccessful rider, Mr. McCullough accurately 
described his crime, took full responsibility for it, and did not attempt to minimize his 
conduct. (PSI, pp.7-8.) See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing 
sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the 
support of his family in his rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 
348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), reversed on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) 
15 Mr. McCullough even identified one of his problem areas as "maturity." (PSI, p.34.) 
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(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed 
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue); State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that some leniency is required when the 
defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his 
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character"). 
The court sentenced Mr. McCullough without sufficiently considering all of the 
mitigating factors present in this case. Because the district court failed to consider all of 
these factors, it abused its discretion in imposing a seven-year sentence. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. McCullough 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). 'The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion." State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 
2010). Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court 
reviews the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original 
judgment. Id. at 289. 
Mr. McCullough contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction in light of his limited successes during his period of retained jurisdiction, his 
recognition of a problem, and his desire to move on to a more successful future. 
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Mr. McCullough recognizes that his period of retained jurisdiction was not as 
successful as desired. However, he did have some limited successes during the period 
of retained jurisdiction. There were numerous positive notes in his file. (PSI, pp.14, 
16.) While on his rider, Mr. McCullough did not receive any Disciplinary Offense 
Reports. (PSI, p.3.) As far as informal disciplinary sanctions, Mr. McCullough had 
minor disciplinary issues approximately once a month. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. McCullough arrived at the North Idaho Correctional Institution on 
September 26, 2011. (PSI, p.4.) He engaged in minor offenses such as being late for 
work on October 17, 2011, and, on November 14, 2011, he received a verbal warning 
for taking food from the kitchen. (PSI, p.3.) On December 27, 2011, Mr. McCullough 
was written up for attempting to trade two envelopes for saltine crackers. (PSI, p.3.) 
His worst infraction was for "conspiracy to steal from the kitchen" on January 12, 2012. 
(PSI, p.3.) Apparently, Mr. McCullough and two other offenders admitted to stockpiling 
food from the kitchen. (PSI, p.3.) It should be noted that this last disciplinary sanction 
was the tipping point whereby Mr. McCullough's assigned Drug/Alcohol Rehabilitation 
Specialist made the decision to recommend revocation even though Mr. McCullough's 
progress in the Sex-Offender Assessment Group (hereinafter, SOAG) was satisfactory. 
(PSI, pp.9-11.) 
Mr. McCullough was not entirely unsuccessful on his rider. The report indicated 
that Mr. McCullough came to class (SOAG) prepared and participated in the group, 
accepting feedback and did not try to rationalize his statements. (PSI, p.4.) A Sex 
Offender Risk Assessment was completed on January 10, 2012, to assist in the 
probation planning process for Mr. McCullough's release. (PSI, pp.7-10.) 
Mr. McCullough was prepared to talk about his crime with the clinician and took full 
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responsibility for his crime. (PSI, p.7.) Mr. McCullough's account of his crime was 
consistent with the version in the PSI-he tried to persuade the victim to have sex with 
him and she spurned his advances, after which he stopped his sexual advances and 
went home. (PSI, p.8.) The clinician found that Mr. McCullough has the ability to be 
successful in the community and (initially) recommended probation back into the 
community. (PSI, p.8.) The clinician found Mr. McCullough demonstrated that he 
could be amenable to treatment based on his efforts in group, the fact that he had not 
gotten into much trouble, his active participation in the group process in SOAG, his 
readiness to present assignments. and his acceptance of feedback and positive 
response to redirects. (PSI, p.9.) However, based solely on the fact that 
Mr. McCullough admitted to participating in food theft (along with two other inmates), 16 
the clinician changed his mind and decided to recommend relinquishment instead of 
probation. (PSI, pp.9-10.) And based solely on that report, and without a hearing, the 
district court relinquished jurisdiction. (R., p.64.) 
The district court relinquished jurisdiction even though it had promised 
Mr. McCullough a hearing (should the report of the Department of Corrections 
recommend relinquishment) at which Mr. McCullough's psychosexual evaluator would 
be permitted to testify as to why incarceration was not an appropriate placement for 
Mr. McCullough. (09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) 
Based upon the above information, Mr. McCullough contends the district court 
abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction. In light of all of the mitigating 
evidence that was presented to the district court that demonstrates Mr. McCullough's 
16 Mr. McCullough was found to be quite susceptible to peer pressure and "following the 
crowd." (09/1/11 Tr., p.25, Ls.22-25.) 
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significant rehabilitative potential, his limited successes while on his rider, and the fact 
that the district court promised Mr. McCullough a hearing should the Department of 
Corrections recommend relinquishment, the district court abused its discretion when it 
failed to place Mr. McCullough on probation or to sua sponte reduce Mr. McCullough's 
sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, upon relinquishing jurisdiction over his 
case. 
IV. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Provide Mr. McCullough A 
Hearing And In Unduly Limiting The Information It Considered In Ruling On 
Mr. McCullough's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion 
A. Introduction 
In the present case, defense counsel requested a hearing on Mr. McCullough's 
Rule 35 motion-a hearing to provide the district court with additional information 
through the testimony of Dr. Johnston as to his recommendations either for probation or 
for incarceration. (09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19; R., pp.58-60.) Due to considerable 
confusion as to the location of Mr. McCullough, the Rule 35 motion was not heard. 
(009/15/11 Tr., p.40, L.20 - p.41, L.13; p.44, L.13 - p.45, L.14.) The district court did, 
however, tell defense counsel that if the rider recommendation came back 
recommending relinquishment, it would hold a hearing and allow Dr. Johnston to testify. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) However, the district court did not hold a hearing on 
either the rider review or the Rule 35 motion. Mr. McCullough submits that the district 
court abused its discretion when it failed to hold a hearing because the district court 
promised Mr. McCullough a hearing should Mr. McCullough come back from the rider 
with a recommendation that he go to the penitentiary. Mr. McCullough relied on the 
promise of the district court to his detriment. Further, the district court was aware, or 
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should have been aware of the substance of the additional evidence Mr. McCullough 
intended to introduce as the district court had promised Mr. McCullough that he would 
receive a hearing at which Dr. Johnston would be able to testify regarding his opinions 
and his recommendation for probation. The district court failed to schedule a hearing, 
and abused its discretion when it unduly limited the information it considered when 
ruling on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion. 
B. The Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Conduct A Hearing Where 
The Psychosexual Evaluator Was Expected To Testify That The Results Of The 
Examination Were "Skewed" 
A motion to reduce an otherwise lawful sentence is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the judge who rules on it. State v. Arambula, 97 Idaho 627 (1976). 
Mr. McCullough acknowledges that the decision whether to hear testimony or argument 
on a Rule 35 motion is directed to the sound discretion of the district court. See State v. 
Arambula, 97 Idaho 627 (1976); State v. Torres, 107 Idaho 895, 898 (Ct. App. 1984). 
However, in this case the district court told Mr. McCullough that he would be allowed a 
hearing and once it made that determination, the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to allow Mr. McCullough that procedure. 
On September 1 and September 15, 2011, the district court heard from 
Mr. McCullough's counsel as to the substance and content of Dr. Johnston's proposed 
testimony. (09/01/11 Tr., p.23, L.16 - p.24, L.8; 09/15/11 Tr., p.35, L.20 - p.4, L.12.) 
Defense counsel advised the district court that Dr. Johnston would be testifying as to 
why the results of the psychosexual in Mr. McCullough's case were "skewed" or 
unreliable, and presumably why the penitentiary would not be an appropriate placement 
for Mr. McCullough. (09/01/11 Tr., p.23, L.16- p.24, L.8; 09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19; 
R., pp.58-60.) Although Mr. McCullough filed a renewed Rule 35 motion for the purpose 
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of reminding the district court that he had been promised a hearing, the court did not 
allow a hearing on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion, finding that "[d]efendant would like 
to present mitigating evidence not present or reflected in the Rider Review. Defendant 
has not stated what that evidence is and the court does not intend to hold an evidentiary 
hearing." (R, p.68.) This was erroneous, as on September 15, 2011, the defendant did 
advise the court of what evidence and testimony he would present at the rider review 
hearing. 
THE COURT: All right, so you think Dr. Johnston would have 
different information than what the court took from his 
evaluation? 
MR. STEVELEY: Correct, Judge. He shared with me some insight that 
he says normally does not get into the report He 
likes to keep the report as objective and benign as 
possible without a lot of personal interjection, but he 
shared with me some things that I think if the court 
had known at the time of sentencing, it might have 
made a difference. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.36, Ls.16-25.) 
The Court inquired further: 
THE COURT: So is Dr. Johnston going to recommend something 
other than structured treatment and then go into a 
community-based program? 
MR STEVELEY: I don't think he had anticipated, at least by my 
conversation with him, that Devon was going to be 
sent on a rider. 
THE COURT: But look what he says in his report is "he needs 
structured treatment and then transferred to 
community-based." That's what he wrote. 
MR. STEVELEY: I have a feeling if he were testifying right now that you 
might not hear that. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.37, Ls.12-22.) 
And Mr. Steveley went on to explain: 
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MR STEVELEY: ... I'm just saying he gave an explanation to me that 
he agreed there's some subjective, personal, 
psychological opinion that he would normally share 
that he does not put in his report. 
(09/15/11 Tr., p.38, Ls.2-5.) 
However, the district court did not allow Mr. McCullough an opportunity to 
present the testimony and evidence it had previously advised him it would hear, should 
the Department of Correction recommend that Mr. McCullough serve the remainder of 
his sentence in the penitentiary. Instead the court relied upon the written report by the 
Department of Correction when it relinquished its jurisdiction (R., p.64) and then denied 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion without a hearing (R., pp.68-69). 17 
While this is an unusual procedural development, Idaho case law supports the 
conclusion that Mr. McCullough was unfairly deprived of an opportunity to present 
testimony and evidence in support of his request for probation. In Anderson v. State, 
133 Idaho 788 (Ct. App. 1999), the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
outside the statute of limitation. The State moved to dismiss on that ground. At a 
subsequent hearing, the petitioner argued that the statute of limitation should be tolled 
because he was mentally incompetent following his conviction. Although the petitioner 
did not provide evidence of his mental incompetency during that hearing, the district 
court affirmatively told him that he could testify about the matter at a later hearing. The 
district court then dismissed the petition without ever receiving the petitioner's 
testimony. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner had been deprived of his 
opportunity to present evidence in response to the State's motion to dismiss. The Court 
found: 
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Although Anderson's initial expectation that he could respond to the 
motion by presenting oral testimony at the hearing was unwarranted and 
contrary to the law governing such proceedings, when the district court 
nonetheless informed Anderson that such testimony would be allowed at a 
subsequent hearing, Anderson became justified in relying upon that 
promised opportunity. Had the court correctly informed Anderson that he 
was not entitled to present oral testimony on a motion for summary 
dismissal, he might have sought and obtained leave of court to file belated 
affidavits. 
Id. at 793. 
Like the facts in Anderson, the district court's actions misled Mr. McCullough into 
believing that he did not need to file an affidavit from Dr. Johnston because 
Dr. Johnston would be allowed to testify at either Mr. McCullough's retained jurisdiction 
hearing or at a subsequent Rule 35 hearing. Presumably Mr. McCullough was relying 
on the district court's promise that, should his Rider Review recommend relinquishment, 
the district court would schedule a hearing and would allow Dr. Johnston to testify 
regarding whether Mr. McCullough should be sent to prison. 18 Because of this reliance, 
Mr. McCullough did not submit a written affidavit from Dr. Johnston, but instead was 
likely waiting patiently for the district court to schedule a rider review hearing, or 
alternatively, a hearlng on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion. After jurisdiction was 
relinquished without a hearing, Mr. McCullough immediately renewed his Rule 35 
motion in an attempt to obtain the hearlng he was promised. (R., p.66.) However, the 
district court denied that motion without a hearing. (R., pp.68-69.) 
17 "The court is persuaded by the review of his conduct submitted by professionals who 
are there to help him rehabilitate." (R., p.68.) The court also went on to quote several 
lines and phrases from the Rider Review report. (R., p.69.) 
18 The district court had two opportunities to set the promised hearing during which 
Dr. Johnston would testify: (1) the court could have allowed testimony and evidence to 
be presented at a rider review hearing; or (2) the district court could have heard 
testimony from Dr. Johnston at a Rule 35 hearing. 
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Here, the district court specifically stated that it would provide Mr. McCullough 
with a hearing contingent on the satisfaction of conditions precedent, but failed to 
schedule one. Accordingly, Mr. McCullough submits that the district court abused its 
discretion by failing to provide him with a hearing once it had promised such a hearing 
on his retained jurisdiction/Rule 35. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Unduly Limited The Information 
It Considered In Ruling On Mr. McCullough's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994 ). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction." Id. 
Rule 35 movants wishing to submit additional evidence should introduce 
evidence, either by affidavit or in the motion itself, to enable the district court to 
determine whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. ( See State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 
328 (Ct App. 1993.) In ruling on a Rule 35 motion, a district court must make a 
"reasoned decision on whether to hold an evidentiary hearing ... " Id. The district court 
abuses its discretion in determining whether to hold a hearing on a motion for reduction 
of sentence without hearing testimony or oral argument if the court unreasonably 
refuses to consider relevant evidence or otherwise unduly limits the information 
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considered. State v. Bayles, 131 Idaho 624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Izaguirre, 145 
Idaho 820, 824 (Ct. App. 2008) 
Presumably relying on the representations of the district court, Mr. McCullough 
did not submit an affidavit in support of his Rule 35 motion (R., p.66), apparently hoping 
that the district court would remember its promise and set the matter for hearing. The 
district court did not deliver on this promise, and instead denied Mr. McCullough's Rule 
35 motion without a hearing. (R., pp.68-69.) 
However, the district court had previously promised Mr. McCullough a hearing on 
his Rule 35. (09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) Further, Mr. McCullough's initial Rule 35 
motion, filed on September 13, 2011, set forth the basis for the February 2, 2012, 
motion. 19 (R., pp.58-60.) The district court did not issue a decision on the 
September 13, 2011, Rule 35 motion until after the second Rule 35 motion was filed. 
(R., pp.58-69.) In its February 15, 2012, decision, the district court failed to incorporate 
the substance of the September 13, 2011, Rule 35 motion and made no reference to it 
(R., pp.68-69), although the court was, or should have been, aware that Mr. McCullough 
intended to call Mr. Johnston to testify as to the results of the psychosexual evaluation 
and whether it was appropriate to place Mr. McCullough on probation (see generally, 
09/15/11 Tr.). Therefore, by failing to hold a hearing on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 
motion, and failing to consider the substance of Mr. McCullough's September 13, 2011, 
Rule 35 motion, the district court unreasonably refused to consider relevant evidence 
and unduly limited the information it considered. It is likely that the testimony of 
19 Defense counsel requested that the court set a hearing so that Dr. Johnston could 
testify to further explain how the results of the psychosexual evaluation are "skewed" 
due to Mr. McCullough's age and level of maturity. (R., pp.58-59.) 
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Mr. Johnston regarding Mr. McCullough's suitability for probation would have altered the 
decision of the district court to order the penitentiary sentence executed. 
In State v. Izaguirre, 145 Idaho 820 (Ct. App. 2008), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
examined the question of whether a district court abused its discretion by unduly limiting 
the information when ruling on a Rule 35 motion. In that case, the district court denied 
the defendant's motion for a neurocognitive evaluation and declined to consider articles 
from professional journals on brain development that were submitted by the defendant 
in support of his Rule 35 motion. The Idaho Court of Appeals found that the trial court 
erred in denying the Rule 35 motion and not ordering an evaluation because there was 
reason to suspect neurocognitive abnormalities. Id. at 823. The Court also found that 
the district court abused its discretion when it unduly limited the information it 
considered by refusing to review the articles on which the defendant partially based his 
Rule 35 motion Id. at 824. The Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the order denying the 
motion for a neurocognitive evaluation, vacated the sentence and remanded the case 
for resentencing. Id. at 823. 
The facts of Mr. McCullough's case are similar to those in Izaguirre. In his 
February 15, 2012, Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and Request for Hearing, 
Mr. McCullough moved the court to reconsider its decision to relinquish jurisdiction. (R., 
p.66.) Mr. McCullough asked for a hearing to allow him an opportunity to present 
mitigating evidence not contained in the APSI. (R., p.66.) Mr. McCullough was likely 
referring to the statements of the court on September 15, 2011, regarding the 
opportunity to elicit the testimony of Dr. Johnston for the district court's consideration. 20 
20 Dr. Johnston's opinion on the "skewed" results of a psychosexual examination 
administered to an 18-year old was not information that would be contained in the APSI. 
( See PSI, pp.2-6.) 
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(09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) Mr. McCullough filed the motion presumably in an 
attempt to jog the court's memory of its promise to conduct a hearing on the matter (R., 
p.66), the district court's promise made contingent on a recommendation for 
relinquishment (09/15/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19). This was the only means by which 
Mr. McCullough would be able to remind the court of its promise to hold a hearing 
during which Dr. Johnston would be permitted to testify. Dr. Johnston's (proposed) 
testimony as to how the results of the psychosexual examination were "skewed" due to 
Mr. McCullough's young age, and his recommendations regarding the appropriateness 
of placing Mr. McCullough on probation, were relevant to the district court's decision on 
whether to place Mr. McCullough on probation. 21 
On February 28, 2012, just thirteen days later, the district court denied 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion without a hearing. (R., pp.68-69.) In its opinion, the 
district court noted that "Defendant would like to present mitigating evidence not present 
or reflected in the Rider Review. Defendant has not stated what that evidence is and 
the court does not intend to hold an evidentiary hearing." (R., p.68.) The district court 
failed to consider the testimony from Dr. Johnston, as the court did not schedule the 
promised hearing before it denied Mr. McCullough's motion. Further, the district court 
did not refer to, or appear to even consider, the substance of the September 13, 2011, 
Rule 35 motion in its February 28, 2012, decision. (R., pp.68-69.) 
Mr. McCullough asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying 
him a hearing on his Rule 35 motion. Mr. McCullough asserts that the district court's 
denial of his motion for a hearing on his motion for sentence modification represents an 
21 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probably or less 
probably than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401. 
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abuse of discretion because the court's denial unduly limited the information the court 
considered when ruling upon Mr. McCullough's Rule 35. 
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear that the district court abused its discretion in 
failing to allow Mr. McCullough the promised hearing at which Dr. Johnston would be 
permitted to testify, and thereby unduly limited the information it would consider before 
ruling on Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion. Thus the district court erred in failing to 
reduce his sentence or place him on probation pursuant to Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. McCullough respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate or place him on probation. Alternatively, he requests that his case 
be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. Mr. McCullough 
alternatively requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and the 
case remanded to the district court to allow the court to hear testimony in support of 
Mr. McCullough's Rule 35 motion 
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